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A. INTRODUCTION 
 
In numerous countries, stop and search powers are an open sore upon police-community 
relations, one which is increasingly being challenged through the courts. In the USA, the 
discriminatory practices associated with stop and search powers led to the coining of terms 
such as ³driving while black´ (more recently joined by ³flying while brown´). In 2013, the 
District Court for the Southern District of New York held, inter alia, that the City of New 
York was liable for their indifference towards the New York City Police Department¶V
widespread practice of stop and frisk which violated the fourth and fourteenth amendments of 
the Constitution.1 In England stop and search practices were a commonly cited factor in the 
                                                     
* &KDQFHOORU¶V)HOORZ, University of Strathclyde. I am grateful to Dr Claire McDiarmid and 
3URI.HQQHWK1RUULHIRUWKHLULQVLJKWVUHJDUGLQJFKLOGUHQ¶VFDSDFLW\WRFRQVHQWDQGWRWKH
anonymous reviewer for their constructive comments. The usual caveats apply. 
1 Floyd et al v the City of New York et al 959 F Supp 5d 540 (2013).  
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Tottenham riots, and a stop, search, and arrest power was the catalyst for the Brixton riots.2 
Since 2010, stop and search has come before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
in two cases, one from the Netherlands, the other from the UK.3 Other examples can be found 
across the globe.4  
By contrast, until very recently stop and search was a non-issue in Scotland. A senior 
LQVSHFWRUIURP+HU0DMHVW\¶V,QVSHFWRUDWHRI&RQVWDEXODU\LQ6FRWODQG(HMICS) is quoted by 
Murray as stating that:  
 
Stop and search was never in my years at HMIC Scotland raised as an issue. And that 
in itself is curious « The Scottish Human 5LJKWV&RPPLVVLRQGLGQ¶WUDLVHLWWKH
Scottish Government diGQ¶WUDLVHLWWKHUHZDVQRFODULRQFDOOIURPWKHPHGLDIRULW
The police services themselves, perhaps understandably because nobod\¶VDVNLQJ
them, GLGQ¶WUDLVHLW.5  
 
This is indeed curious given the broadly similar powers and crime trends across the UK. 
What is even more surprising is the fact that since the mid-¶Vthe rates of stop and search 
per capita in Scotland have significantly exceeded those in England and Wales, peaking in 
2012/13 with rates of stop and search seven times higher in Scotland.6 The publication of 
0XUUD\¶Vseminal report on Scottish stop and search in January 2014 catapulted the issue into 
the spotlight, and stop and search (particularly the non-statutory variety) has become one of 
the major issues facing Police Scotland.7 In addition to significant media interest,8 there have 
                                                     
2 The power was the Metropolitan Act 1839, s 66. Lord Scarman, The Brixton Disorders 10±
12 April 1981 (Cmnd 8427: 1981); Riots, Communities and Victims Panel, Five days in 
August (An Interim Report on the 2011 English riots) (2011).  
3 Colon v the Netherlands (2012) 55 EHRR SE5; Gillan v United Kingdom (2010) 50 EHRR 
45. 
4 See L Weber and B Bowling, Stop and Search: Police Power in a Global Context (2013) 
for a discussion of stop and search in Hungry, Japan, South Africa, India, Australia, Canada, 
and the Netherlands.  
5 Cited in K Murray, ³6WRSDQGVHDUFKLQ6FRWODQG$QHYDOXDWLRQRISROLFHSUDFWLFH´
SCCJR 1.  
6 K Murray, ³6WRSDQGVHDUFKLQ6FRWODQG$SRVWUHIRUPRYHUYLHZ´6&&-5 
7 Murray (n 5).  
8 See, e.g., P Hutcheon, ³1HDUO\RQHLQHYHU\ILYH*ODVZHJLDQVVXEMHFWHGWRVWRSDQGVHDUFK´
(The Herald, 21 June 2015); S Carrell, ³3ROLFHVWRSDQGVHDUFKUDWHVLQ6FRWODQGIRXUWLPHV
KLJKHUWKDQLQ(QJODQG´7KH*XDUGLDQ-DQXDU\ 
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been inquiries by the HMICS,the Scottish Police Authority and the Advisory Group on Stop 
and Search, established by the Scottish Government in March 2015.9  
While the scholarship on Scottish stop and search is burgeoning, significant gaps 
remain. This article will contribute to redressing this void by examining the legal basis for 
and compatibility of Scottish stop and search powers with the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR). The analysis will highlight numerous failings in the current regime, 
some of which reveal incompatibility, some of which suggest that incompatible practices may 
occur (although there is insufficient data to confirm or dispel the thesis), others which 
³PHUHO\´ evidence very poor practice.  
The crux of all debates on stop and search is how to balance the discretion inherent in 
the power with the requirements of lex certa while also ensuring sufficient safeguards against 
abuse. In the language of the ECHR, how to ensure the power is prescribed by law? On the 
one hand, this discretion is an inherent and necessary part of the powers, and speaks to the 
primary purpose of stop and search: to permit the police a power, short of arrest, whereby 
they can confirm or allay suspicions of a persRQ¶VLQYROYHPHQWLQFULPLQDOLW\ thereby 
enabling the detection of crime.10 This discretion, evident in all the powers, whether statutory 
or non-statutory, is further complicated by the location of stop and search within street 
policing, which is typically RI³ORZYLVLELOLW\´DQGwhere the ³norms and practices of the 
street level police officer take pULRULW\RYHURXWVLGHUHJXODWLRQ´.11 The discretion must be 
sufficiently bound to ensure the instruments are prescribed by law. This requirement of the 
ECHR, which reflects general principles of the rule of law,12 has three aspects: (1) the power 
must have a basis in law;13 (2) it must be sufficiently foreseeable so that people understand 
the potential consequences and can regulate their actions accordingly;14 and (3) there must be 
                                                     
9 HMICS, Audit and Assurance Review of Stop and Search: Phase 1 (2015); Scottish Police 
Authority, Scrutiny Review on stop and search (2014); Advisory Group on Stop and Search, 
The Report of the Advisory Group on Stop and Search (2015). 
10 Report of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (Cmnd 8092: 1981) (³RCCP´). 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (³PACE´), Code A, para 1.4. 
11 A Sanders and R Young, ³3ROLFH3RZHUV´LQ71HZEXUQHG, Handbook of Policing 
(2003) 229.  
12 See, for example, J Raz, ³7KHUXOHRIODZDQGLWVYLUWXH´/45 
13 Malone v United Kingdom (1991) 13 EHRR 448. 
14 Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1979) 2 EHRR 245. 
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³a measure of protection in domestic law against arbitrary interferences by public 
DXWKRULWLHV´.15  
Routine stop and search engages the right to a private life under Article 8 of the 
ECHR.16 Depending on the circumstances, Articles 10 and 11 (freedom of assembly and 
speech) and Article 14 (prohibition on the discriminatory application of the ECHR rights and 
freedoms) may also be engaged. Despite the ECtHR¶VVXJJHVWLRQin Gillan v United Kingdom 
WKDWWKHFRHUFLYHQDWXUHRIWKHVWRSZDV³indicDWLYHRIDGHSULYDWLRQRIOLEHUW\´, it seems 
unlikely that Article 5 is engaged by a routine stop and search.17 7KH³WKUHVKROG´ZKHUHD
restriction on movement, protected under Protocol 4, Article 2 (which has not been ratified by 
the UK), becomes a deprivation of liberty is notoriously amorphous, being ³PHUHO\RQHRI
GHJUHHRULQWHQVLW\DQGQRWRQHRIQDWXUHRUVXEVWDQFH´18 Cases such as Secretary of State for 
the Home Department v MB, where a fourteen hour curfew under a control order was held not 
to be a deprivation of liberty,19 suggest that, coercion notwithstanding, a routine stop and 
search would not cross the threshold.20 
As well as being prescribed by law, stop and search powers must be exercised 
proportionately in order to comply with the ECHR. This article will focus on the former 
requirement for two reasons. First, it has been the key issue before the courts and precedes 
questions of proportionality: if an instrument is not prescribed by law, it cannot be 
proportionate. Second, greater detail on the practice of stop and search is needed to assess 
proportionality properly. The data and research currently available is insufficient for this task 
in relation to some of the categories of stop and search.21 
This article will first outline the powers of stop and search in Scotland. It will then 
examine in turn the compatibility of each category of stop and search with the ECHR: 
                                                     
15 Olsson v Sweden (1989) 11 EHRR 259, para [61]. See also Gillan. 
16 Gillan; Colon.  
17 Gillan para [57]. Cf R (on the application of Gillan) v Commissioner of Police for the 
Metropolis [2006] 2 AC 307, [2006] UKHL 12, para [26] and Roberts v Commissioner of 
Police of the Metropolis [2014] 1 WLR 3299, [2014] EWCA Civ 69, para [13].  
18 Guzzardi v Italy (1981) 3 EHRR 333, para [93]. 
19 [2007] UKHL 46. By contrast, sixteen hours curfew was a deprivation of liberty: Secretary 
of State for the Home Department v JJ [2007] UKHL 45. See also: Trijonis v Lithuania 
(2005) app no 2333/02, judgment of 17 March 2005 regarding house arrest. 
20 Cf D Mead, ³7KHOLNHO\HIIHFWRIWKH+XPDQ5LJKWV$FWRQHYHU\GD\SROLFLQJGHFLVLRQVLQ
(QJODQGDQG:DOHV´-&/ 
21 Although the evidence base is growing rapidly. See Murray (nn 5 and 6); 02¶1HLOO/
Aston, and A Krause, ³7KH)LIH'LYLVLRQ3ROLFH6FRWODQG6WRSDQG6HDUFK3LORW(YDOXDWLRQ
)LQGLQJVDQG5HFRPPHQGDWLRQV´015); HMICS (n 9). 
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suspicionless statutory powers, suspicion-based statutory, and the non-statutory power. The 
key issue in relation to the suspicionless statutory powers is whether the system of 
authorisation sufficiently balances the virtually unfettered discretion of officers regarding 
who to select to stop. Suspicion-based statutory powers raise concerns regarding the 
definition of reasonable suspicion, the UHTXLUHPHQWVUHODWLQJWRRIILFHUV¶FRQGXFWGXULQJWKH
encounter and systems of review more generally. In addition to issues regarding consent, the 
absence of safeguards to limit the risk of the arbitrary deployment of the non-statutory power 
raises significant concerns.  
 
 
B. SCOTTISH STOP AND SEARCH POWERS 
 
(1) Suspicion-based statutory powers 
Stop and search powers fall into two types: statutory and non-statutory. The former may be 
further sub-divided into suspicionless powers and those triggered by reasonable suspicion. To 
begin with this final category, which constitutes the vast majority of the statutory class, the 
powers tend to follow a similar formula: the police may stop and search a person if they 
reasonably suspect an offence has been, is being, or is about to be committed, or that the 
person is carrying a prohibited article. Some powers extend also to vehicles or vessels, 
drivers and passengers. The statutes use a variety of wording, such as ³UHDVRQDEOHVXVSLFLRQ´, 
³reasonable grRXQGV´, and ³UHDVRQDEOHFDXVH´.22 Because there is no practicable difference 
between these phrases, and for the sake of clarity, this article will refer only to reasonable 
suspicion.  
There are stop and search powers in relation to persons suspected of ³FRUH´ criminal 
offences: possession of or carrying an offensive weapon23 in a public place24 or on school 
premises,25 or of an article with a blade or point, again in a public place or on school 
                                                     
22 E.g., ³UHDVRQDEO\VXVSHFWV´7HUURULVP$FWV³UHDVRQDEOHJURXQGV´&ULPLQDO/DZ
&RQVROLGDWLRQ6FRWODQG$FWV³UHDVRQDEOHFDXVH´:LOGOLIHDQG&RXQWU\VLGH$FW
1981 s 19. 
23 ³2IIHQVLYHZHDSRQ´LVGHILQHGLQWKH&ULPLQDO/DZ&RQVROLGDWLRQ6FRWODQG$FWV
47(4) as being any article that is made or adapted for use for causing injury to a person or 
intended to cause such injury.  
24 Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995 s 48. 
25 Ibid s 49B.  
6 
 
premises;26 possession of controlled drugs,27 prohibited fireworks,28 or stolen property 
(including property constituting evidence of the commission of theft,29 or located within 
aerodromes and vehicles and aircraft within aerodromes);30 possession of goods which are 
liable to forfeiture under the Customs and Excise Acts 1979;31 or on suspicion of DSHUVRQ¶V
being a terrorist, or in relation to a vehicle reasonably suspected of being used for terrorism.32 
Of note, where these powers are not UK wide there are equivalent powers in England, Wales 
and Northern Ireland, with the exception of stopping and searching for evidence of the 
commission of theft, which is unique to Scotland.33 
A number of powers exist in relation to wildlife and environmental offences. These 
grant constables the power to stop and search a person whom they suspect has committed or 
is committing an offence under Part I of the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981,34 the 
Protection of Badgers Act 1992,35 Part 6 of the Marine (Scotland) Act 2010,36 or Part 2 of the 
Nature Conservation (Scotland) Act 2004.37 Police may also stop and search any person 
suspected of hunting wild animals with dogs.38  
Finally, under the Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995 section 21, the 
police may stop and search any person they suspect of being in possession of alcohol or a 
flare, or being drunk at, while entering, or while in, a designated sporting event. They may 
also stop and search public service vehicles and vehicles which can carry over eight persons 
that are conveying passengers to a designated sporting event and are suspected of carrying 
drunk people or alcohol. This article will not discuss alcohol confiscation powers as they do 
not expressly include a power to search. 
 
                                                     
26 Ibid s 50.  
27 Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 s 23.  
28 Fireworks Act 2003 s 11A. 
29 Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982 s 60. 
30 Aviation Security Act 1982 s 24B.  
31 Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 ss 163±164A.  
32 Terrorism Act 2000 ss 43, 43A. 
33 Although PACE s 1(7)(b) is similar.  
34 Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 s 19. 
35 S 11. 
36 S 126. Part 6 concerns the conservation of seals.  
37 S 43. 
38
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(2) Suspicionless Statutory Powers 
The second type of statutory powers permits suspicionless stop and search in authorised 
areas. There are two such powers, both UK wide: section 60 of the Criminal Justice and 
Public Order Act 1994 and section 47A of the Terrorism Act 2000.  
An inspector or more senior officer may authorise the use of section 60 of the 1994 
Act if such officer reasonably believes that in any locality in the police area incidents 
involving serious violence may take place, and the authorisation is expedient to prevent their 
occurrence or that persons are carrying dangerous instruments or offensive weapons without 
good reason.39 Thereafter a constable in uniform may, without suspicion, stop any person or 
vehicle within the locality and search them, the vehicle, and any passenger for offensive 
weapons or dangerous instruments.40 The authorisation may last up to twenty-four hours and 
can be extended by a further twenty-four hours if it appears to a superintendent or more 
senior officer that it is expedient to do so.41 
The trigger for authorisation under section 47A(1) of the 2000 Act is that an assistant 
chief constable or chief constable reasonably suspects that an act of terrorism will take place 
and the authorisation is necessary to prevent it. The authorisation must be approved by the 
Secretary of State within forty-eight hours or it will lapse, while not affecting the legality of 
actions taken in the interim.42 The authorisation may last up to fourteen days and extend up to 
the entire force area, although it should be no longer nor geographically broader than 
necessary.43 Once authorised, a uniformed officer may stop a person and search for evidence 
that such person is a terrorist or stop a vehicle and search it for evidence that it is being used 
in connection with terrorism.44  
There is a third suspicionless stop and search power (under Schedule 7 to the 2000 
Act) which will not be further discussed here, for three reasons.45 First, it applies to ports and 
                                                     
39 Note that an additional limb in England and Wales permits an authorisation if the officer 
reasonably believes that (a) an incident involving serious violence has taken place, (b) a 
dangerous instrument or offensive weapon used in the incident is being carried in the locality, 
and (c) the authorisation is expedient to find such item (s 60(1)(aa)).  
40 1994 Act s 60(4). 
41 1994 Act ss 60(1), (3). 
42 2000 Act sch 6B para 7. 
43 2000 Act sch 6B para 6.  
44 2000 Act ss 47A(2)±(6).  
45 For details on the use and extent of sch 7, see C Walker, %ODFNVWRQH¶V*XLGHWRWKH$QWL-
Terrorism Legislation (2014) paras 5.115±SDVVLP7KH6FKHGXOH¶V compatibility with 
the ECHR was recently challenged in R (Miranda) v Secretary of State for the Home 
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borders, where more stringent and onerous conditions of passage are traditionally applied and 
persons travelling may be viewed as having consented to the search as a condition of travel. 
Second, the power may be exercised by examining officers, not simply the police. Third, it 
provides a plethora oISRZHUVH[WHQGLQJEH\RQG³PHUH´ stop and search.46  
 
(3) Non-Statutory Powers 
The final category, unique to Scotland within the UK, is non-statutory or ³FRQVHQVXDO´ stop 
and search. There is no requirement of suVSLFLRQLQGHHG3ROLFH6FRWODQG¶V³Stop and Search 
2SHUDWLRQDO7RRONLW´ ³7RRONLW´, which provides non-binding operational guidance to 
officers, explicitly states that non-statutory powers can be deployed when a person ³is not 
acting suspiciously, nor is there any intelligence to suggest that the person is in possession of 
anything illegal´.47  
  
 
C. COMPATIBILITY WITH THE ECHR 
 
Turning now to the compatibility of the powers, the main issue in relation to all categories is 
whether they are prescribed by law.48 This concern is particularly acute in relation to 
suspicionless statutory and the non-statutory powers. The test of reasonable suspicion is 
relevant to the suspicion-based statutory powers and consent to non-statutory powers. There 
are additional issues, particularly in relation to suspicion-based powers, which are better 
viewed as bad practice rather than breaches of the ECHR, which shall also be highlighted.  
As the two ECtHR cases on stop and search, Gillan v United Kingdom and Colon v 
the Netherlands, concern suspicionless statutory powers, that category will be analysed first 
                                                     
Department [2014] EWHC 255 (Admin), [2014] 1 WLR 3140. See further: D Anderson, The 
Terrorism Acts in 2013 (2014) paras 4.11±4.23. See also Beghal v DPP [2015] UKSC 49 on 
questioning under sch 7. 
46 Although subject to reasonable suspicion, the powers to stop and search under the Modern 
Slavery Act 2015 sch 2, paras 2±3 and under the Counter-Terrorism Act 2015 sch 1, para 2 
bear more resemblance to sch 7 for these reasons.  
47 Toolkit (2014) 8. 
48 1RWHWKHWHUP³LQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKHODZ´LVXVHGLQWHUFKDQJHDEO\ZLWK³SUHVFULEHGE\
ODZ´7KHUHis no difference between these expressions, which are translations of the same 
)UHQFKH[SUHVVLRQ³prévues par la loi´ (Sunday Times para [48]).  
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in order to determine the approach taken by the court.49 The subsequent sections will assess 
whether the statutory and non-statutory powers breach the ECHR.  
 
(1) Suspicionless statutory powers 
In Gillan, the power conferred by section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 ³WKH$FW´ (the 
predecessor to the currently applicable section 47A, which replaced it) was held not to be 
prescribed by law. Less than two years later, ³SUHYHQWLYHVHDUFKHV´ (broadly analogous to the 
searches authorised under section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994) were 
held in Colon to be prescribed by Dutch law and justifiably to infringe Article 8, although it 
is notable that the complaint was restricted to whether effective judicial remedies were 
available. The respective powers conferred by the British and Dutch legislation will be briefly 
outlined, before assessing the contrasting outcomes. 
Under section 44, a senior police officer could authorise the use of the power if he 
considered doing so ³expedient for the SUHYHQWLRQRIWHUURULVP´.50 The Secretary of State had 
to confirm the authorisation, which could extend across the force area and last for up to 
twenty-eight days.51 Once authorised, a uniformed officer could stop and search any person, 
vehicle or passenger therein within the authorised area for articles of a kind that could be 
used in connection with terrorism.52  
In relation to ³preventive searches´XQGHU'XWFKODZ, a Local Council could, under 
the Municipalities Act section 151b, pass a bye-law enabling the Burgomaster (Mayor) of a 
municipality to desiJQDWHDQDUHDRIWKHFLW\DVD³VHFXULW\ULVNDUHD´ if there was a ³public 
order disturbance caXVHGE\WKHSUHVHQFHRIZHDSRQV´ or fear of this occurring.53 Colon 
concerned the Burgomaster of Amsterdam, who after consultation with the head of the 
regional police and the public prosecutor, had made designations for successive six and 
(later) twelve month periods.54 Thereafter, the public prosecutor was permitted to designate a 
                                                     
49 Colon v the Netherlands (2012) 55 EHRR SE5; Gillan v United Kingdom (2010) 50 EHRR 
45. 
50 Terrorism Act 2000 s 44(3). Note that ss 44±47 were repealed under the Protection of 
Freedoms Act 2012 s 59. 
51 2000 Act s 46(2). 
52 2000 Act s 45(1)(a). 
53 Colon para [2]. 
54 Colon paras [3], [5] [14]±[16]. There was one twenty-four month designation which was 
later reduced to twelve months [16]. 
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twelve hour period in which the police could conduct suspicionless stop and search on 
persons or vehicles, the object of the search being offensive weapons.  
Refusal to submit to a search, or the obstruction of an officer in the exercise of either 
power, was a criminal offence punishable by up to six monthV¶ imprisonment and/or a level 5 
fine (in relation to section 44 of the 2000 Act) 55 or up to three months¶ imprisonment and/or 
a fine (in relation to preventive searches).56 
The Dutch authorisations were more narrowly tailored, owing to the system of 
double-designations. The ECtHR also highlighted the greater democratic control evident in 
Colon.57 Presumably this referred to the involvement of the Local Council and the greater 
ease with which the bye-law could be changed, as well as to the role of the public prosecutor. 
However, the deployment of the power in both cases was remarkably similar, with virtually 
unfettered discretion afforded to officers. The key difference therefore appears to have been 
the practice. In Gillan the various accountability structures over the authorisation process had 
demonstrably failed by the time of the case. Despite the nominal geographical and temporal 
limits, section 44 of the 2000 Act was in force across the entire Metropolitan Police Service 
area continuously from February 2001 until July 2009. No authorisations were refused by the 
Secretary of State.58 However, in Colon the ECtHR did not inquire into whether a similar 
³UXEEHU-VWDPSLQJ´RFFXUUHGLQrelation to preventive searches: the area in question had been 
under continuous designation from 2002 to 2009, which suggests the accountability systems 
PD\QRWKDYHEHHQSDUWLFXODUO\ULJRURXVDOWKRXJKLWZDVQRWVWDWHGKRZPDQ\³VXE-
GHVLJQDWLRQV´ZHUHLPSRVHGE\WKHSXEOLFSURVHFXWRUSimilarly, while the ECtHR noted in 
Gillan WKHGLVSURSRUWLRQDWHLPSDFWRQ³EODFN´DQGHWKQLFPLQRULW\FRPPXQLWLHV, and that 
there were no terrorism related arrests subsequent to a search under the 2000 Act section 44, 
there was no discussion in Colon of these issues in relation to preventive searches.59 
Crucially, however, in Colon the Dutch government relied on two independent studies which 
showed that the use of weapons had decreased in the security risk areas and increased in 
relation to other areas.60 7KHUHZDVQRHTXLYDOHQW³SURRI´RIHIIHFWLYHQHVVSURIIHUHGLQGillan. 
                                                     
55 2000 Act s 47. 
56 Netherlands Criminal Code art 184. 
57 Colon para [67]. 
58 Gillan para [80].  
59 Gillan paras [84]±[85]. 
60 COT Institute for Safety and Crisis Management, Evaluatie Preventief Fouilleren in 
Amsterdam: opbrengsten, wapenincidenten en hot spots (2007); COT Institute for Safety and 
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Three key points can be gleaned from these cases. First, routine stops and searches 
will engage Article 8 of the ECHR. Second, the greater the discretion in relation to whom to 
select to stop and search (what Ip terms ³EDFN-HQG´ discretion61), the greater the oversight 
that will be required, for example through a system of authorisation. As the oversight itself 
involves discretion (ZKDW,SWHUPV³IURQW-HQG´GLVFUHWLRQ), this must also be sufficiently 
controlled. Third, although the effectiveness of the scheme should not speak to whether the 
power is prescribed by law or not, being relevant to whether the infringement is justifiable, it 
appears from Colon to carry significant weight.  
  In light of Colon and Gillan, it may be asked: is the power conferred by section 47A 
of the 2000 Act prescribed by law? The section is an improvement on its predecessor. The 
authorisation process has been tightened by raising the trigger IURP³H[SHGLHQW´ to 
³necesVDU\´, with the added requirement that the authorising officer reasonably suspects that 
an act of terrorism will take place.62 The accompanying Code of Practice, which in a 
departure from section 44 of the 2000 Act applies to the authorisation as well as deployment 
of the power, states that authorisations cannot be solely aimed at public reassurance, 
deterrence, or intelligence-gathering.63 The maximum temporal limit has been reduced and a 
new requirement added that the geographical and temporal limits be no more than necessary 
to prevent the act of terrorism.64 There is nominally a prohibition on ³UROOLQJ´ authorisations, 
although this is undermined by the contemplation of successive authorisations in the Code.65 
In terms of back-end discretion, little has changed. While the object of the search has been 
altered, it remains exceptionally broad, largely because of the breadth of the definition of 
                                                     
Crisis Management, Evaluatie Preventief Fouilleren in Amsterdam: de stand van zaken 
(2006). 
61 J Ip, ³7KHUHIRUPRIFRXQWHUWHUURULVPVWRSDQGVHDUFKDIWHUGillan v United Kingdom´
(2013) 13 HRLR 729 at 731. 
62 S 47A(1). 
63 Home Office, Code of Practice (England, Wales And Scotland) for The Exercise of Stop 
and Search Powers Under Sections 43 and 43a of the Terrorism Act 2000, and the 
Authorisation and Exercise of Stop and Search Powers Relating To Section 47a of, and 
Schedule 6b to, the Terrorism Act 2000 +HUHDIWHU³&RGH2I3UDFWLFH7HUURULVP$FW
´para 4.1.6. This is significant given that the primary objectives of s 44 for the police 
were deterrence and disruption. See further G Lennon, ³3UHFDXWLRQDU\7DOHV6XVSLFLRQOHVV
counter-WHUURULVWVWRSDQGVHDUFK´&&- 
64 +RPH2IILFH³&RGHRI3UDFWLFH7HUURULVP$FW´SDUDV 
65 Ibid, para 4.3. 
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terrorism,66 and a ³FOHDUULVNRIDUELWUDULQHVV´ remains.67 Much will therefore depend on the 
actual use of the power, especially as the law is sufficiently broad and vague to permit a 
varied practice. This has been restrained in the extreme: notwithstanding events such as the 
London Olympics and the Glasgow Commonwealth Games, there has been no authorisation 
in Great Britain to date.68 The sole authorisation occurred in Northern Ireland in the summer 
of 2013.69 It appears therefore that the police are adhering to the spirit and not just the letter 
of the law. Notably, it seems probable that a degree of imminence between the suspected act 
of terrorism and the necessity of the authorisation has been implied. Given this approach, the 
power seems likely to be one prescribed by law.70  
What of section 60 of the 1994 Act? Its compatibility with the ECHR was recently 
considered by the Supreme Court in Roberts v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, 
which, affirming the decisions of the Court of Appeal and the Divisional Court, unanimously 
dismissed the appeal.71 The Court accepted that suspicionless stop and search will constitute 
an interference with Article 8.72 As in Gillan, the power clearly has a basis in law,73 the issue 
being whether there are sufficient safeguards to prevent its arbitrary use.  
The Court outlined the relevant case-law, discussing Gillan, Colon and Beghal, which 
concerned stops under Schedule 7 of the 2000 Act, but did not explain how these cases 
applied to or could be distinguished from the case in hand.74 The concluding discussion 
asserted the benefits of suspicionless powers, notwithstanding the inherent risk that they will 
be used in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner.75 The potential for discrimination was 
primarily addressed by noting that it is unlawful for officers to act in a discriminatory manner 
under Code A, the HRA section 6 and the Equality Act 2000.76 This circular reasoning ± that 
the police will not act unlawfully because it would be unlawful to do so ± does not evidence 
                                                     
66 2000 Act s 1. See, e.g., Anderson, Terrorism Acts (n 45) paras 4.20±4.21, 10.6±10.18; C 
Walker, ³7KHOHJDOGHILQLWLRQRIµWHUURULVP¶LQ8QLWHG.LQJGRPODZDQGEH\RQG´3/
331. 
67 Gillan para [85].  
68 D Anderson, The Terrorism Acts in 2014 (2015); Anderson, Terrorism Acts (n 46). 
69 Anderson, Terrorism Acts (n 45) paras 6.8±6.11. 
70 Cf E Cape, ³7KHFRXQWHU-terrorism provisions of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012: 
Preventing misuse or a case of smoke anGPLUURUV"´&ULP/5DW±398. 
71 [2015] UKSC 79, [2014] 1 WLR 3299, [2014] EWCA Civ 69.  
72 Roberts para [3]. 
73 Discussed further below in relation to the non-statutory power. 
74 Paras [15]-[26]. 
75 Para [41]. 
76 Paras [34]-[37]; [42].  
13 
 
sufficient safeguards against the arbitrary exercise of section 60 of the 1994 Act. Notably, all 
these provisions applied equally to section 44 yet the ECtHR explicitly voiced concerns over 
LWVLPSDFWRQ³EODFN´DQGHWKQLFPinority communities.77 The Supreme Court concluded by 
KLJKOLJKWLQJIHDWXUHVRIWKHDXWKRULVDWLRQDQGGHSOR\PHQWSURFHVVHVWKDW³PDNHLWSRVVLEOHWR
MXGJHZKHWKHUWKHDFWLRQZDVµQHFHVVDU\LQDGHPRFUDWLFVRFLHW\«IRUWKHSUHYHQWLRQRI
GLVRUGHURUFULPH¶´78 While adequate review processes are a necessary element of legality, 
they cannot of themselves cure a power that is so broad as to risk arbitrariness. Moreover, the 
question of whether the interference is proportionate and therefore justifiable is secondary to 
the issue of whether the power is prescribed by law. The judgment fails to provide a clear 
exposition of the how the putative safeguards minimise the potential for the arbitrary exercise 
of the power. 
The front-end discretion afforded to officers under section 60 of the 1994 Act is more 
circumscribed than section 44 of the 2000 Act was. As Kay, LJ noted in the Court of Appeal, 
WKHFULWHULDIRUDXWKRULVDWLRQUHTXLUHV³WKDWWKHDXWKRULVLQJRIILFHUUHDVRQDEO\EHOLHYHV
specified things relating to serious vLROHQFHGDQJHURXVLQVWUXPHQWVDQGRIIHQVLYHZHDSRQV´
DQGWKLV³LQFRUSRUDWHVDQREMHFWLYHFULWHULRQZKLFKLVPRUHUHDGLO\VXVFHSWLEOHWRMXGLFLDO
UHYLHZ´79 In addition the temporal and geographical limits are narrower. 
However, the back-end discretion, where the risk of arbitrary treatment is most acute, 
is largely equivalent. Section 60 has a narrower object for the search but, as the ECtHR stated 
in Gillan, this does little to fetter discretion as officers are not required to suspect the person 
is in possession of the object.80 Although the Supreme Court noted that the ECtHR in Gillan 
ZDV³>D@ERYHDOO«FRQFHUQHGDWWKHEUHDGWKRIWKHGLVFUHWLRQJLYHQWRWKHLQGLYLGXDOSROLFH
RIILFHU´WKHMXGJPHQWIDLOVWRH[SODLQKRZVHFtion 60 substantially differs in the discretion it 
affords individual officers.81  
While a comparison with Gillan suggests that section 60 of the 1994 Act would not be 
prescribed by law, preventive searches muddy the waters, affording the same back-end 
discretion to officers with a virtually identical object of the search as section 60. Comparing 
the three powers, the back-end discretion is the virtually identical for each. The front-end 
discretion for section 60 is slightly more circumscribed than for section 44 but lacks any of 
                                                     
77 Gillan para [85]. 
78 Paras [44]-[47]. 
79 Roberts (CA) para [23].  
80 Gillan para [83].  
81 Roberts (SC) para [20]. 
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the additional democratic features seen in Colon or the system of double designation. While 
judicial review has more to grasp in relation to section 60 than with section 44 this is only in 
relation to the authorisation process; in relation to the back-end discretion, any review, 
judicial or otherwise, faces the same challenges as it would have under section 44. Colon 
suggests that the actual practice could be the trump card. 
The Supreme Court in Roberts DVVHUWHGWKDWWKHUHDUHµJUHDWEHQHILWVWRWKHSXEOLF¶
from suspicionless powers such as that under section 60 in relation to deterrence and 
increased detection, referring to the judgment of Moses, LJ in the Divisional Court.82 
However, the benefits must be balanced against any detriment impact and account must be 
taken of the effectiveness of the power. Moses, LJ noted there were 4,273 arrests in 2008-09, 
compared with the total absence of arrests under section 44 of the 2000 Act.83 However, 
Moses, LJ fails to put this in context. The 4,273 arrests accounted for 2.8% of the total stops 
conducted under section 60 that year. Moreover, only 533 arrests ± or 0.3% of the total ± 
were in anticipation of violence.84 2008/09 represented the peak usage of the power, with 
149,955 stops and searches conducted. In 2010, when Ms Roberts was stopped, the number 
of stops was starting to decline but remained exceptionally high (118,112 in 2009/10 and 
60,145 in 2010/11).85 This peak usage coincided with the greatest degree of 
disproportionality ± only 40% of stops were of white persons in 2009/10, falling to 31% in 
2010/11 before starting to slowing rise again.86 At face value, these statistics evidence greater 
levels of disproportionality than section 44 had.87 The practice seems to have turned a corner 
± prompted, presumably, in part by Roberts. The latest figures for 2011/12 show the number 
of stops has collapsed to 46,871, and it seems likely that, as a result of the Best Use of Stop 
and Search Scheme (BUSS) discussed below, this trajectory will continue.88 Nonetheless, the 
                                                     
82 Para [41].  
83 Roberts (QB) para [40]. 
84 Ministry of Justice, Statistics on race and the criminal justice system 2010 (2012). 
85 Ibid and Ministry of Justice Statistics on race and the criminal justice system (2013).  
86 Ministry of Justice, Statistics (2013) 44. According to the 2011 census³ZKLWH´ people 
FRQVWLWXWHGRIWKH(QJOLVKDQG:HOVKSRSXODWLRQV216³(WKQLFLW\DQG1DWLRQDO,GHQWity 
LQ(QJODQGDQG:DOHV´ see http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/2011-census/key-
statistics-for-local-authorities-in-england-and-wales/rpt-ethnicity.html. 
87 See, e.g., M Shiner, Report on the use of section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public 
Order Act 1994 by the police (February 2012) and Report for Bhatt Murphy Solicitors 
(available at: 
http://www.stopwatch.org/uploads/documents/Shiner_expertwitnessstatement_s60.pdf).  
88 Ministry of Justice, Statistics (2013). The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), the largest 
user of s 60, have reduced the authorisations by 97% and the overall number of s 60 stops by 
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practice at the time Roberts was stopped and the effectiveness of the power more generally 
merited consideration by the Court.   
It is not possible to say with any certainty what the outcome of an appeal of Roberts 
to the ECtHR would be. But the combination of the changing practice, the closer similarity of 
the power to Colon than Gillan, and the apparent turning of the tide evident in cases like 
Austin v United Kingdom89 and Colon, suggest that the power would be held to be prescribed 
by law.90 Certainly, current practice under BUSS seems likely to be so.  
However, this conclusion does not necessarily apply to section 60 of the 1994 Act as 
practiced in Scotland, as there are a number of differences between the jurisdictions. First, 
there is no equivalent to PACE Code A. 3ROLFH6FRWODQG¶V³7RRONLW´, discussed further below, 
lacks the requisite granularity and is not binding upon officers. Notwithstanding the 
preceding criticism oI&RGH$¶VUHOHYDQFHWRZKHWKHUthe power is prescribed by law, it has 
been afforded a degree of importance by the domestic courts. Second, the English and Welsh 
forces have accepted a number of additional ± and voluntary ± restrictions upon the power 
under the BUSS. The trigger has been UDLVHGWR³QHFHVVDU\´ and the maximum time limit 
reduced to 15 hours, extendable by a further 24.91 There is also a requirement that all 
authorisations are communicated to the public afterwards and, where practicable, in 
advance.92 Third, practice diverges radically between Scotland and the rest of Britain: while, 
owing to the total inadequacy of the Scottish data, it is impossible to state with any certainty, 
it appears that section 60 is largely unused (this is discussed further in the next section). This 
makes sense, given the availability of non-statutory stop and search. Were non-statutory stop 
and search to be prohibited, as suggested in an amendment to the Criminal Justice (Scotland) 
Bill,93 this would raise the possibility of a rapid rise in the use of section 60 to bridge the gap 
between areas where non-statutory powers were previously used when it was suspected that 
offensive weapons were being carried. 
                                                     
99%: see http://content.met.police.uk/Article/How-we-use-stop-and-
search/1400022268811/1400022268811. Although cf F Hamilton, ³.QLIHFULPHRQLQFUHDVH
DVVWRSDQGVHDUFKIDOOV´7KH7LPHV-XQHSp 1±2, which stated that the MPS 
Commissioner was considering increasing stop and search.  
89 (2012) 55 EHRR 14. See further G Lennon, ³7KHSXUSRVHRIWKHULJKWWROLEHUW\XQGHUWKH
(&+5$UWLFOH´:HE-&/, 
90 See also M Zander, ³6HFWLRQVWRSDQGVHDUFK,6ODZIXO´&/	-: 
91 Home Office, Best use of stop and search scheme (2014). 
92 Ibid.  
93 Proposed amendment 49 (McInnes). 
16 
 
To ensure that the power conferred by section 60 of the 1994 Act is prescribed by law 
in Scotland, a number of changes should be made. The changes under BUSS are positive and 
should be adopted, ideally through statutory amendment rather than on a voluntary basis. As 
argued below, additional regulation along the lines of Code A is desperately needed in 
relation to all areas of stop and search, as are heightened post-hoc systems of accountability. 
Specifically in relation to section 60, data should be published on the number of 
authorisations and stops conducted, and these should be linked to the locality for which they 
are authorised. There may be grounds for some anonymization when publishing the data, 
however the full data set should be provided to the relevant oversight bodies (such as the 
Scottish Police Authority and the HMICS). The use of suspicionless statutory powers in 
relation to demonstrations has proven contentious at times in England and Wales, impacting 
both directly and through the chilling effect upon the rights to free assembly and speech, and 
guidance on the appropriate use of the power at protests should be issued.94  
Using the power to plug the holes which the non-statutory power would traditionally 
have dealt with, whether with fifteen or twenty-four hour maximums, would necessitate very 
frequent, if not near-rolling, authorisations in some localities. In essence, such an approach 
would largely undermine the apparent value of the authorisation process. Even with the 
proposed changes, such practice is reminiscent of the approach of the MPS in relation to 
section 44 of the 2000 Act. An ineffectual authorisation process that appears to be merely 
rubber-stamping, and which goes hand-in-hand with an unfettered power of deployment, is 
likely to fail the standards required by the ECHR.  
  A more radical option which might permit broader use of the power would be to adapt 
from the Dutch their system of double-designations. The Procurator Fiscal would be an 
obvious choice to mirror the role of the Public Prosecutor, although there are, of course, a 
number of differences in their roles. Another option would be to require judicial approval. 
Following Colon, the added layer of accountability may possibly be sufficient to permit more 
extensive use of the power, particularly if evidence showed it is effective, although a near 
constant sub-designation is unlikely to be prescribed by law even with judicial oversight. 
 
                                                     
94 See, e.g., R (Laporte) v Chief Constable of Gloustershire Constabulary [2007] 2 AC 105, 
[2006] UKHL 55; Joint Committee on Human Rights, Demonstrating Respect for Rights? A 
human rights approach to policing protest (HL 47-I, HC 320-I: 2009) ±especially paras 86±
95 (in relation to s 44); K Reid, ³/HWWLQJGRZQWKHGUDZEULGJHUHVWRUDWLRQRIWKHULJKWWR
SURWHVWDW3DUOLDPHQW´/DZ&ULPHDQG+LVWRU\16 at 46.  
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(2) Suspicion-based statutory powers 
There are two, interlinked, issues with this category of powers: whether the main safeguard of 
reasonable suspicion is adhered to by the police and whether there are sufficient additional 
safeguards to prevent the arbitrary deployment of the powers. The latter may raise concerns 
about whether the powers are prescribed by law, but as detailed below, the arguments are 
relatively weak and are better considered as bad practice rather than incompatibility with the 
ECHR. Deploying one of these powers without reasonable suspicion would be illegal and the 
officer may be committing actionable wrongs, in relation to assault and wrongful detention. 
Evidence secured through the search may also be deemed inadmissible, although the court 
can excuse irregularity in the method by which the evidence was obtained.95 
The ³SULQFLSal safeguard´ over statutory stop and search powers is the trigger of 
reasonable suspicion.96 The test for reasonable suspicion was set out in 2¶+DUDY&KLHI
Constable of the RUC,97 and applied most recently in Scotland in relation to stop and search 
in McAughey v HM Advocate.98 2¶+DUDprovides a hybrid test:  
 
In part it is a subjective test, because [the officer] must have formed a genuine 
suspicion in his own mind «In part also it is an objective one, because there must 
also be reasonable grounds for the suspicion which he has formed.99  
 
7KHVXVSLFLRQPXVWEHLQWKHRIILFHU¶VPLQGDWWKHWLPHWKHSRZHUis deployed, and must be 
based on facts known at that time.100 Suspicion may be based on evidence that would be 
inadmissible in court.101 As reaffirmed in recent High Court judgments, instructions from a 
superior cannot, without more, constitute reasonable suspicion, as the officer conducting the 
search will have no objective grounds upon which to base a suspicion.102  
                                                     
95 Lawrie v Muir 1950 JC 19. See further P Duff, ³$GPLVVLELOLW\RILPSURSHUO\REWDLQHG
SK\VLFDOHYLGHQFHLQWKH6FRWWLVKFULPLQDOWUDLO´(GLQ/5 
96 RCCP (n 10) para 3.25.  
97 [1997] AC 286, approved in 2¶+DUDY8QLWHG.LQJGRP (2002) 34 EHRR 32. For further 
discussion of the discretion at play in relation to reasonable suspicion and arrest, see C Ryan 
and K Williams, ³3ROLFH'LVFUHWLRQ´>@3/ 
98 2014 SCL, [2013] HCJAC 163. 
99 2¶+DUDat 298 per Lord Hope. 
100 HMA v B 2013 SCL 592, [2013] HCJ 71. 
101 Shaaban Bin Hussien v Chong Fook Kam [1970] AC 942. 
102 HMA v B; McAughey v HMA [2013] HCJAC 163, 2014 SCCR 11. See also Raissi v 
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2009] QB 564, [2008] EWCA Civ 1237. 
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7KH³Toolkit´ defines reasonable suspicion as suspicion  
 
that is backed by a reason capable of articulation and is something more than a hunch 
or a whim « The officer has to have intelligence or information supporting the reason 
for the search such as the person slurring their words or that the person is showing 
EHKDYLRXUWKDWLVOHDGLQJWRWKHRIILFHU¶VVXVSLFLRQ103 
 
This fails clearly to emphasise the need for officers to have formed the suspicion themselves. 
There is also no explicit linkage between the suspicion and the object of the search. 
Suspecting someone of some criminal behaviour is not sufficient as grounds for a statutory 
stop and search: the suspicion must relate to the object of that particular power. Contrast 
PACE Code A para 2.2, where the test for reasonable suspicion requires:  
 
Firstly, the officer must have formed a genuine suspicion in their own mind that they 
will find the object for which the search power being exercised allows them to 
search«; and (ii) Secondly, the suspicion that the object will be found must be 
reasonable. This means that there must be an objective basis for that suspicion based 
on facts, information and/or intelligence which are relevant to the likelihood that the 
object in question will be found, so that a reasonable person would be entitled to reach 
WKHVDPHFRQFOXVLRQEDVHGRQWKHVDPHIDFWVDQGLQIRUPDWLRQDQGRULQWHOOLJHQFH´104 
 
The ³Toolkit´ goes on to list a number of factors: intelligence on the location, suspect, 
friends, families, or associates; previous convictions or knowledge of subject; PNC/CHS 
ZDUQLQJVLJQDOVWKHVXVSHFW¶VFRXUVHRIFRQGXFWGHPHDQRXUor explanation as to why they 
are at thDWORFDWLRQWKHVXVSHFW¶VFORWKLQJpossessions, or ± where possession of alcohol is a 
factor ± age; and recent incidents (responding to a gang fight where weapons were 
mentioned).105 While these may all be relevant, the majority must be coupled with additional 
information in order to provide adequate grounds for suspicion, and the Toolkit should be 
                                                     
103 At 6. 
104 Para 2.2 (emphasis in the original). 
105 At 6. 
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explicit on this point. For example, tKHPHUHIDFWRIDSHUVRQ¶VDVVRFLDWLRQVRUSUHYLRXV
convictions cannot provide reasonable suspicion.106  
Overall, thH³7RRONLW¶V´ guidance is at best ambiguous and at worst misleading. Key 
aspects of the legal test are not made clear and the confusing list of factors may encourage 
officers to rely on irrelevant or insufficient grounds.  
The second, related, issue concerns the regulation of officer conduct during and after 
the search. As the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure commented in 1981, when 
assessing stop and search powers LQ(QJODQGDQG:DOHVWKHUHLVD³ULVNWKDWWKHFULWHULRQ>IRU
reasonable suspicion] could be loosely interpreted´7KH&RPPLVVLRQ FRQFOXGHGWKDW³WKH
notification of the reason for the search to the person who has been stopped, the recording of 
searches by officers, and the monitoring of the records by supervising officers would be the 
most effective and practical ways of reducing tKHULVN´107 It also recommended that all 
officers proviGHWKHSHUVRQVWRSSHGZLWKWKHRIILFHU¶V name and number.108 Currently, 
Scottish practice fails to meet these minimum standards. An exceptionally light-touch 
approach to regulating officer conduct is taken, with inconsistency in the rules that exist. 
Requiring an officer to inform the person stopped of the grounds for the stop and 
search provides a check upon the arbitrary exercise of the power, as well as being important 
LQHQVXULQJWKHSHUVRQ¶VVDWLVIDFWLRQZLWKthe encounter.109 Where found in Scottish 
legislation, the requirement to provide grounds only applies when the officer moves to search 
the person, not at the initial point of stopping them. It is required for some powers but not 
others, with the division being largely unintelligible. For example, an officer is required to 
inform a person stopped and searched on suspicion of being in possession of or carrying an 
offensive weapon in a public place of the reason why the person is being detained for a 
search, but not if the search takes place on school premises.110 This is not a blanket exception 
for schools: a person stopped and searched on suspicion of being in possession of or carrying 
an article with a blade or point, whether in public or on school premises, must be informed of 
                                                     
106 McArdle v Egan (1934) 150 LT 412 (prior convictions); Reynolds v Commissioner of 
Police for the Metropolis [1982] Crim LR 600 (association). See, further, Ryan and Williams 
(n 97). 
107 RCCP (n 10) para 3.25. 
108 Ibid para 3.22. 
109 N Bland, J Miller, and P Quinton, Upping the PACE? An evaluation of the 
recommendations of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry on stops and searches (2000); RCCP (n 
10) para 3.25. 
110 Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995 ss 48, 49B. 
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the reason for the search.111 Other examples abound. If there is logic here, it is beyond the 
ability of this author to discern it.  
There are, however, some predictable patterns. Powers enabled by UK statutes do not 
require officers to inform the person of the reason for the search. This is presumably because 
it is required under section 2 of PACE 1984 in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland, with 
additional requirements found in section 3 and in Code A. Stops and searches conducted 
anywhere in the UK under the Terrorism Act 2000 must adhere to the relevant Code.112  
Scottish police officers do not need to identify themselves if they are in uniform. By 
contrast, in the rest of the UK the police are obliged to provide their name and the name of 
their station.113 This is rigorously enforced by the courts, when challenged. For example, in R 
v Christopher BristolWKH&RXUWRI$SSHDOTXDVKLQJWKHDSSHOODQW¶Vconviction, rejected the 
police RIILFHU¶Vassertion that he could not provide his name and station before applying 
mandibular pressure to prevent a suspected wrap of drugs being swallowed.114 An oIILFHU¶V
name ± or warrant number if appropriate ± and station is important information in order for a  
person to make a complaint or to query conduct that has taken place.  
Again in contrast to the position in the rest of the UK, Scottish police do not need to 
LVVXHDQ\IRUPRIZULWWHQUHFRUGWRWKHSHUVRQVWRSSHG7KHLVVXLQJRIWKHVH³VWRSIRUPV´ZDV
instituted in the rest of the UK following the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, and a form must be 
given to all persons stopped and searched at the time, unless there are exceptional 
circumstances.115 These stop forms were broadly welcomed by the public in the pilot study, 
who perceived the key benefits as having information on ³WKHUHDVRQIRUWKHVWRSWKHQDPHRI
the officer in case they wanted to complain; and the explanation of police powers and public 
ULJKWV´.116 In a recent pilot study in Fife, advice slips were issued to all persons stopped and 
searched. Although the study recommended including additional details, it broadly welcomed 
                                                     
111 Ibid s 50.  
112 TerrorisP$FWV$(+RPH2IILFH³Code of Practice 7HUURULVP$FW´. This 
anomaly is not limited to stop and search: e.g.. prior to Cadder v HM Advocate 2010 SCL 
1265, [2010] UKSC 43, anyone arrested under the Terrorism Act 2000 s 41 had a right to 
access to a lawyer, and to various other safeguards found in PACE Code H.  
113 PACE s 2(2)±(3). 
114 (2008) 172 JP 161, [2007] EWCA Crim 3214. See also R (Michaels) v Highbury Corner 
0DJLVWUDWHV¶&RXUW [2010] CrimLR 506, [2009] EWHC 2928 (Admin) (applies even when 
officer and suspect are known to each other). 
115 PACE Code A paras 4.1, 4.2B.  
116 Bland, Miller and Quinton (n 109) x.  
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these trials DV³DSRVLWLYHGHvelopment for stop and search practice as they help to increase its 
WUDQVSDUHQF\´117  
While the current focus on stop and search has led to a number of ad hoc forms of 
scrutiny,118 all are exceptional one-offs.119 A systematic and routine review structure is 
urgently needed. A major impediment to effective post-hoc scrutiny in Scotland is the lack of 
rigorous recording requirements, coupled with the absence, until 2014, of published data.120 
While bare statistics will neither prove nor disprove bad practice, they are a vital cog in the 
accountability wheel and can aid in identifying areas of concern that merit further 
investigation. Routine post-hoc scrutiny is particularly important, as research shows that 
individuals tend not to make formal complaints against the police, even when dissatisfied.121 
Of course, such data must be relevant and accurate. HMICS have stated that WKH\³GRQRW
have confidence in the stop and search data currently held by Police Scotland´DQGWKDWWKH 
stop and search database requires substantial improvements to be fit for purpose.122  
Officers are currently obliged to record: their name; the date, location, and time of the 
stop and search; whether it is statutory or non-statutory; whether any items were detected; 
and, if so, what they were. In addition, they may record the stopped SHUVRQ¶VGHWDLOV, for 
instance date of birth. While this is fine as far as it goes, there is insufficient detail for 
effective accountability.123 It is imperative that the grounds for reasonable suspicion be 
recorded so that the major safeguard over the suspicion-based statutory powers can be 
evaluated.124 The legislative power used should also be recorded. This would feed into the 
                                                     
117 2¶1HLOO$VWRQDQG Krause (n 21) para 4.6.2. 
118 See nn (9) and (Error! Bookmark not defined.). 
119 Cf RCCP (n 10) which recommended that stop and search data be included in annual 
reports in order to enable Police Authority scrutiny, and that the HMIC examine the powers 
in their annual force reports (para 3.2.6). 7KH+0,&¶VDQQXDO3((/,QVSHFWLRQVLQFOXGHD
question on stop and search, available at https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/our-
work/peel-assessments/peel-2015-questions/. 
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122 HMICS (n 9) 5. On the importance of accurate data, see further Sir M Bichard, The 
Bichard Inquiry Report (HL 2008-09, 18-I). While beyond the scope of this article, there 
must also be adequate structures for securing and rHWDLQLQJGDWD3ROLFH6FRWODQG³ORVW´ 
20,087 stop and search records due to human error (see further HMICS 58±63).  
123 See further HMICS (n 9).  
124 For instance, an analysis of the grounds for reasonable suspicion formed a key part of  
+0,&¶VDQDO\VLVLQ³6WRSDQGVHDUFKSRZHUV$UHWKHSROLFHXVLQJWKHPeffectively and 
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assessment of the relevant grounds, permit the identification of policing trends, and may 
provide an indication of whether the powers are being used appropriately. For example, if a 
high proportion of items seized under a particular power were not the object of the search 
(e.g. drugs found in an offensive weapons search), this could indicate that officers are not 
employing the appropriate legislation or are acting without reasonable suspicion; further 
evaluation would then be merited. The outcome of the search should also be recorded. At the 
least, whether the person was detained or arrested should be noted, although a broader range 
of outcomes would be preferable as it would permit a more nuanced assessment of the 
powers. For example, under BUSS, officers are required to record one of seven outcomes: 
arrest, summons, caution, Khat or cannabis warning, penalty notice, community resolution, or 
no further action disposal.125  
It is clear that significant changes are needed to the regulation of officer conduct and 
recording requirements. These, and an improved explanation of reasonable suspicion, should 
be instituted through a statutory code along the lines of PACE Code A, which would be 
binding upon officers and the breach of which would be admissible as evidence, though not 
of itself constituting either a civil or criminal wrong.126  
While the current approach falls well short of best practice, is it compatible with the 
ECHR? The absence of a systematic review structure and the difficulties in enforcing one, 
given the inadequate data recording and the absence of stop forms, heighten the risk of the 
arbitrary deployment of the powers. This, alongside the lack of a requirement for officers to 
provide their name or warrant number, may also complicate attempts to seek redress in the 
courts. However, it is doubtful that these issues, even in conjunction with the absence of a 
detailed code of practice, would lead the ECtHR to conclude that the powers were not 
prescribed by law. The powers are not unfettered: they are bounded by the requirement of 
reasonable suspicion in relation to the object of the search. While it is arguable how effective 
this is in practice, there are routes for redress through the domestic courts if a search is 
conducted without reasonable suspicion, notwithstanding the inevitable difficulties of proving 
such a claim. Given that preventive searches were prescribed by law, it seems highly 
improbable that suspicion-based statutory ones would fall at that hurdle.  
 
                                                     
125 Para 1.3. 
126 See PACE 1984 s 67(10) and (11). 
23 
 
(3) Non-statutory powers 
Turning finally to the most problematic category, non-statutory stops and searches, the major 
issue is whether the power is ECHR compliant.  
In the absence of a statutory power, it is the consent of the stopped person that ensures 
the police have not committed one or more actionable wrongs (such as assault). While the 
question of consent depends on individual circumstances, current practice raises concerns in 
relation to whether consent was informed and voluntary, and whether all persons stopped had 
capacity to consent.  
Following Brown v Glen, police are not required to inform the person that consent to 
the stop and search may be withheld.127 Lord Sutherland reasoned that:  
 
Where « the police are making general enquiries and the person with whom they are 
dealing has not reached the stage where he could be described as a suspect, except in 
the most general and nebulous sense, the police are not obliged to caution the person 
as to his answers to questions and there appears to us to be no logical reason why they 
should be obliged to issue any caution to accompany a request for a search to be 
carried out when it must be perfectly obvious that the answer to that request may be 
either yes or no.128 
 
The analogy with stop and question is misplaced. The public nature of a search and the 
DFFRPSDQ\LQJSRWHQWLDORI³an element oIKXPLOLDWLRQDQGHPEDUUDVVPHQW´ was singled out 
E\WKH(&W+5DV³compounding the VHULRXVQHVVRIWKHLQWHUIHUHQFH´ with the right to a 
private life under Article 8 of the ECHR.129 Whether the search is of tKHSHUVRQ¶VSRFNHWVRU
DIXOO³SDW-GRZQ´, perhaps after outer clothing has been removed, this is necessarily more 
intrusive than asking someone a question.  
More generally, should the police be required to inform the person that consent may 
be withheld? International approaches vary on whether consent is nugatory in the absence of 
                                                     
127 1998 JC 4. 
128 Ibid 6. See also Freeburn v HM Advocate 2013 SCL 47, [2012] HCJAC 135. 
129 Gillan [63]. The potential for embarrassment from a public search was also acknowledged 
by Lord Hope in R (Gillan) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2006] UKHL 12 
[48] and Kay LJ in Roberts v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2014] 1 WLR 3299, 
[2014] EWCA Civ 69, at [15].  
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being informed of the right to refuse. While Canada130 and New Zealand131 require it as a 
prerequisite to consent, neither Australia132 nor the USA do.133 The approach of the former 
jurisdictions should be preferred for two reasons. First, consent must be informed. As Mr 
Justice Marshall stated in his dissent in the leading US case:  
 
I am at a loss to understand why consent ³cannot be taken literally to mean a 
µknowLQJ¶FKRLFH´« In fact, I have difficulty in comprehending how a decision made 
without knowledge of available alternatives can be treated as a choice at all.134 
 
The second reason is the authoritative character of the police. The Canadian Supreme Court 
held that consent without a clear indication of the right to refuse is invalid ³>E@HFDXVHRIWKH
intimidating nature of police action and uncertainty as to the extent of police powers, 
compliance in such circumstances cannot be regarded as voluntary in any meaningful 
VHQVH´135 As noted by WKH1HZ=HDODQG+LJK&RXUW³ZKLOHFRQVHQWPD\LQFOXGH
acquiescence, it must be a genuine consent and not a mere acquiescence in what a person 
believeVWREHDQRWKHU¶VODZIXOULJKW´136 Research conducted in the late 1980s in England ± 
when non-statutory stops and searches were permitted ± supports the view that the 
DXWKRULWDWLYHFKDUDFWHURIWKHSROLFHLPSDFWVXSRQSHRSOH¶VFKRLFHWRFRQVHQW, finding that the 
combination of the lack of knowledge and power on the part of the person stopped, the 
unwillingness of police to give information, DQGWKHLUWHQGHQF\WR³EDPERR]OH´WKHVXVSHFW
PHDQWWKDW³µconsent¶ « frequently consists of acquiescence based on ignoUDQFH´DJDLQVWD
EDFNJURXQGRI³FRQWH[WXDOLUUHOHYDQFHRIULJKWVDQGOHJDOSURYLVLRQV´137 This, and other 
research, also reveals /RUG6XWKHUODQG¶VVWDWHPHQWWKDW³LWPXVWEHSHUIHFWO\REYLRXVWKDWWKH
                                                     
130 Dedman v R 1984 46 CR (3d) 193. 
131 Meates v Attorney-General [1981] 2 NZLR 335. 
132 DPP v Leonard [2001] NSWSC 797. 
133 Schneckloth v Bustamonte 412 US 218, 93 S. Ct. 2041 (1973). The case is not without its 
critics: note in particular -XVWLFH0DUVKDOO¶VGLVVHQW6HHDOVRHJ, A Pratt, ³7KHQHHGIRU
µNQRZLQJ¶:K\WKH,RZD6XSUHPH&RXUWVKRXOGUHMHFW6FKQHFNORWKY%XVWDPRQWH´
100 Iowa LR 1327.  
134 Schneckloth at 2077. 
135 Dedman at para [63] per Le Dain, J. 
136 Meates at 346. 
137 D Dixon, D Coleman, and K Bottomley, ³&RQVHQWDQGWKHOHJDOUHJXODWLRQRISROLFLQJ´
(1990) J L and Society 345 at 348.  
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DQVZHUWRWKDWUHTXHVWPD\EHHLWKHU\HVRUQR´to be simply inaccurate.138 A requirement to 
inform the person of their right to refuse cannot be viewed as an unreasonable burden upon 
the police.139 As Justice Marshall concluded, to do otherwise would SHUPLW³DJDPHRI
EOLQGPDQ¶s buff, in which the police always have the upper hand, for the sake of nothing 
PRUHWKDQWKHFRQYHQLHQFHRIWKHSROLFH´140 
It is also worth noting that research shows that at least some officers viewed refusing 
a search as grounds to move to a statutory stop and search.141 This is clearly incorrect and 
serves to undermine the entire concept of consent as the basis for the non-statutory power in 
such cases.  
The other major issue with consent arises from the extensive use of the non-statutory 
power on children. Since June 2014 the power is nominally not meant to be exercised on 
those aged under twelve.142 Previously, children as young as six were subjected to non-
statutory stops and searches, with approximately 500 children aged under ten stopped and 
searched in 2010.143 Indeed, ³young people are significantly more likely to be searched on a 
non-VWDWXWRU\EDVLV´.144 It is questionable whether a young child can fully understand the 
consequences of permitting the police to search them. If they are not fully informed, consent 
is not valid. 
A more basic problem is whether young, especially very young, children can in law 
consent to a non-statutory search. Certainly those under eight ± the age of criminal 
responsibility ± must be incapable of such consent. It is, however, difficult to establish where 
a bright-line may lie for older children. One overarching problem is how to frame the 
interaction, as criminal or civil law. On the one hand, consent enables the police to perform 
actions that would otherwise be delicts; on the other, the child may be subject to criminal 
prosecution due to evidence found during the search. Whichever framework is used, there are 
                                                     
138 R Delsol, Institutional Racism, the Police and Stop and Search: A Comparative Study of 
Stop and Search in the UK and USA (unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Warwick, 2006) 
116. 
139 Cf Schneckloth at 2057 but note the dissent of Mr Justice Marshall, n 12 at 2078. 
140 Schneckloth at 2079. 
141 Murray (n 5) 4. 
142 Scottish Parliament Justice Sub-Committee on Policing, 19 June 2014: see Scottish 
Parliament, Official Report col 460 (19 June 2014); but cf M Ellison, ³3ROLFHVHDUFKKXQGUHGV
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143 Murray (n 5) 24. 
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no direct precedents. Under sections 1±2 of the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991, 
children under the age of sixteen have legal capacity to HQWHULQWRDQ\³WUDQVDFWLRQ´if it is of 
a kind that is normally entered into by persons of that age and circumstances. There is 
(thankfully) no need to argue that the substantial usage of stop and search on young persons 
PHDQVLWLVD³QRUPDOWUDQVDFWLRQ´, as the 1991 Act does not alter the delictual or criminal 
responsibility of any party, both of which are potentially engaged. Therefore, the common 
law age of consent may be the appropriate benchmark: this is the age of minority, or puberty, 
fourteen for boys and twelve for girls.145 In 2010, subject to the caveats regarding data 
(in)accuracy, 26,000 children under fourteen were stopped and searched under the non-
statutory power.146 If the common law age of consent is the appropriate test, many of these 
were unlawful. Even if this is not the correct test, and these children had the capacity to 
consent, for the reasons above doubts remain regarding the validity of the consent.  
People may also lack capacity to consent through, for example, mental illness or 
intoxication. Neither category has been flagged as problematic in empirical research to date. 
However, given the use of the power in relation to alcohol and young persons, its use on 
intoxicated youths seems possible if not probable.  
Leaving consent to one side, it is doubtful that non-statutory stop and search is 
prescribed by law. While non-statutory stop and search has (obviously) no statutory base, 
there is no requirement of codification, and as the use of this power has been acknowledged 
in case-law there will be a basis in law.147 However, it is questionable whether the power is 
³formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen ± if need be, with appropriate 
advice ± to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences 
which a given action may entail´.148 In particular the lack of a requirement to inform the 
person that they may refuse the search and the fact that some officers view refusal as grounds 
for a suspicion-based statutory stop cast doubt upon its foreseeability. Also, Malone v United 
Kingdom suggests that, contrary to the position under domestic law,149 an interference with a 
Convention right requires a positive authorisation; the mere fact that the interference is not 
illegal is insufficient.150 Although, as Mead notes, ³JLYHQWKHFRQVHTXHQFHVLWLVQRWKDUGWR
                                                     
145 K Norrie, The law relating to the parent and child in Scotland (2013) para 1.11.  
146 Murray (n 5) 21. 
147 Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1979) 2 EHRR 245 para [47].  
148 S v UK (2009) 48 EHRR 50 [95]. See also Huvig v France (1990) 12 EHRR 528. 
149 See Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1979] Ch 344.  
150 Malone v United Kingdom (1991) 13 EHRR 448.  
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imagine a court « feeling constrained in holding « WKHµODZIXOQHVV¶WHVWWRLQFOXGH
QRQSURVFULSWLRQDVZHOODVSRVLWLYHSURVFULSWLRQ´151  
Even if the foreseeability requirement is met, there are clearly insufficient safeguards 
against the arbitrary exercise of the power. The absence of adequate recording or review 
mechanisms, discussed above, means that the only significant safeguard is consent. While 
consent could bring the power within a different paradigm, it is highly unlikely that the 
ECtHR would view consent as a sufficient safeguard, particularly given the issues outlined 
above. Although not on all fours with Colon or Gillan ± notably, the non-statutory power 
nominally lacks the coercive element evident in both ± this near-total absence of safeguards 
means there is a clear risk of arbitrariness. Unlike Colon, there is no independent evidence of 
effectiveness to which to point. Indeed, the detection rate for non-statutory stop and search, 
which was 8% in 2010, suggests ineffectiveness, if detection is taken as the objective. The 
ECtHR are likely to be concerned by the practice, notably the extensive use of the power, 
which has accounted for approximately 70% of all stops and searches between 2005 and 
2013152 (despite the plethora of statutory powers), as well as the prevalence of its use on 
young people. For example, 37,233 sixteen years olds were stopped in 2010 in the 
Strathclyde area, which at the time had 26,476 sixteen year old residents, resulting in the 
staggering stop rate of 1,406 per 1,000 of the population.153 All this combines to show a clear 
risk of the arbitrary exercise of the power. It therefore seems highly unlikely that the power 
would deemed to be prescribed by law.  
 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
 
Scottish stop and search powers are in urgent of reform. This article has argued that two of 
the three categories ± non-statutory and suspicionless statutory ± are likely to be in breach of 
the ECHR, with the final category evidencing poor practice providing insufficient protection 
to the public and insufficient guidance to officers. Scotland would do well to incorporate the 
limitations to section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, detailed in the BUSS, 
                                                     
151 D Mead, ³,QIRUPHGFRQVHQWWRSROLFHVHDUFKHVLQ(QJOand and Wales ± a critical 
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DSSUDLVDOLQOLJKWRIWKH+XPDQ5LJKWV$FW´&ULP LR 791 at 795. 
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to ensure it is prescribed by law. The non-statutory power is virtually unfettered and unlikely 
to be prescribed by law. It should be prohibited. Alternative powers exist which are subject to 
greater oversight and protection against arbitrary deployment. More generally, a detailed and 
binding code of practice should be adopted. This should include a clearer exposition of 
reasonable suspicion and require officers to, inter alia, inform the person stopped of their 
name or warrant number, the reason for the search, and to issue them with a stop form. A 
systematic and routine review structure is urgently needed and data collection and correlation 
must be improved to facilitate this.  
There is a broader lesson here, namely the need for routine publication of accurate 
and appropriate data on the use of police powers. A spotlight was shone on stop and search 
through 0XUUD\¶VGRFWRUDOresearch, with her FOI requests revealing the substantial rate of 
stop and search in Scotland and prompting her deeper analysis. Oversight of such important 
powers should not rely on the chance choice of a research topic (one which was not even her 
original choice). Greater transparency and routine publication of core data will assist both 
oversight bodies, such as the Scottish Police Authority and HMICS, and academics in 
identifying potentially problematic trends or practices that merit closer scrutiny and those 
evidencing best practice.  
  
 
